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ABSTRACT 
The article deals with the liability of board members for decisions to minimize business 
risks resulting from the pandemic. Based on an important decision by the highest German 
criminal court on a case of the 2008 financial crisis, the article outlines the limits of a safe 
haven within which managers can make decisions without fear of legal consequences. 
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The rapidly spreading pandemic is putting companies under considerable pressure. 
Boards of directors and managing directors have to make far-reaching decisions in the 
shortest possible time with considerable uncertainty in forecasts. It is clear that not every 
decision will have the desired success; some will perhaps cause more harm than good. 
This also raises the question of civil or even criminal liability risks. A decision made by the 
BGH (German Federal Court of Justice) from 2016 is of considerable importance to an-
swering this question. It was based on facts that show structural parallels to the current 
situation. This refers to the decision on the criminal liability for breach of trust of those 
responsible at HSH Nordbank who, under great time pressure during the financial crisis 
of 2007, carried out a transaction to relieve the burden of debt, but who – as became ap-
parent later – thus caused the bank to incur a loss of just under EUR 150 million1. 
 
The responsible persons at HSH Nordbank – like many members of the management 
board in the current crisis – had to make an atypical risk decision. The object of its activi-
ties is not the ordinary course of business, which entails risks as well as new opportunities. 
Rather, measures are required to reduce risks arising from a sudden change in the business 
environment, the dynamics of which are hardly foreseeable. Mitigating these risks may 
require measures that would have been unthinkable just a few days ago – from abandon-
ing a transaction to postponing urgently needed investments, temporarily closing plants 
or applying for government deposits. 
 
When it comes to crisis management, board members and managing directors operate in 
front of an open horizon, just like politics: Only the future will tell whether the drastic 
measures are ultimately necessary and successful – but action must be taken now. In con-
trast to politics, however, managers and entrepreneurs bear a considerable personal liabil-
ity risk. If they act wrongly, they not only risk loss of reputation and, in the worst case, of 
office, but also substantial legal consequences. 
As a result, those responsible in companies find themselves in a dilemma situation in 
which both options for action – immediate action and further waiting – are risky and in 
which every decision made may prove to be wrong in retrospect. It would therefore be 
highly unfair to make the occurrence of legal consequences dependent on the outcome of 
the decision. In addition, a "negative success liability" would have harmful effects on com-
panies and the economy, as it would lead to a slowing down and distortion of decision-
making processes: Managers may be inclined to act only at a time when an option has 
			
1  BGH, NJW 2017, 578 with comments from Alexander Baur & Maximilian Holle, Untreue und unternehme-
rische Entscheidung, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, 555 (2017); Michael Kubiciel, Anmerkung, JU-
RISTISCHEZEITUNG, 72, 585 (2017); Alaor Leite, Prozeduralisierung oder Rechtsgüterschutz bei der Untreue? 
- Risikoverringerung in der Unternehmenskrise am Beispiel der HSH-Nordbank-Entscheidung (BGH NJW 
2017, 578), 580 (2018); Ulrich Leimstoll, Erfordernis einer gravierenden Pflichtverletzung beim Untreuetatbe-
stand (»HSH Nordbank«), STRAFVERTEIDIGER, 388 (394) (2017). 
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expired or has proven to be clearly incorrect. Valuable time to reduce risks for the com-
pany would then be lost. 
 
In order to prevent this, case law (with different approaches that are not always con-
sistent) is trying to limit liability risks. In its HSH Nordbank decision, the 5th Criminal 
Division of the BGH (German Federal Court of Justice) clarified that a violation of (stock 
corporation law) due diligence obligations is only present in the case of "absolutely unjus-
tifiable" conduct2. 
 
It is important to know that the Criminal Division does not interpret § 266 StGB (Ger-
man Penal Code) here, but rather interprets § 93 para. 1 AktG (German Stock Companies 
Act), to which the accessory offence of breach of trust refers. The remarks of the Criminal 
Division on the clarification of the scale of obligations are therefore just as relevant for the 
application of company and liability law as for § 266 StGB. 
 
According to the opinion of the 5th Criminal Division, an "unjustifiable action" is only 
present if the mistake has already forced itself upon an outsider. What sounds like a very 
wide scale, however, becomes considerably narrower when one reads the further remarks 
of the Division. Such an error could also consist in the inadequate collection and analysis 
of information prior to a decision. 
 
However, case law also accommodates decision-makers in a crisis situation. It is necessary, 
but also sufficient, for the board of management to obtain an "appropriate" factual basis, 
taking into account the time factor and weighing up the costs and benefits of further in-
formation acquisition. It is not important that the decision was actually taken on the basis 
of adequate information and in the best interest of the company. Rather, it should suffice 
that the board of management was "reasonably" allowed to assume this at the time of the 
decision.  
These – admittedly soft – criteria provide the decision-makers in the companies with 
what they now need most urgently: a sufficiently large "safe haven" for decisions. 
			
2  for this criterion, see Michael Kubiciel, Gesellschaftsrechtliche Pflichtwidrigkeit und Untreuestrafbarkeit, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 353 (2005). 
